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Law As … IV:  
Minor Jurisprudence in Historical Key.  
An Introduction
Christopher Tomlins*
‘Minor Jurisprudence’ was an invention of the mid-1990s. For that 
reason alone, the song ‘Damnation’s Cellar’, released by Elvis Costello 
and the Brodsky Quartet in 1993, offers an appropriate soundtrack for 
this introduction to our exploration of the concept.1 But as we shall see, 
minor jurisprudence renders sound more than merely accompaniment 
(Rajah 2017: 266-7), more than just an element of the ‘context’ that law 
inhabits. No: here law is sound and sound is law – they are together, 
a songline (Chatwin 1987; but cf Barr 2017: 232, citing Neidjie 
1989: 18-19). Materiality is not context. Instead materality gushes 
out of many of the essays in this volume as law, law instantiated as 
sound, touch, appearance, imprint; in motion, in rhythm, in liveliness. 
Minor jurisprudence is ‘grounded jurisprudence’ in Kirsten Anker’s 
apt description (2017: 193). Here also is a jurisprudence that is light 
to the major’s ‘dark side’ (Davidson 2017: 100). But the minor itself 
can be dark – in its silences (Rajah 2017: 266), in masquerades of 
misunderstanding and deception (Painter 2017: 278-9), in mourning 
and death no less than life (Minkkinen 2017: 158). Looks can deceive, 
the material is just as wily as the ideal (Goodrich 2017: 44). Costello 
asks whether the minor (no less than the major) is tallow or tar? Tallow 
can be molded. Tar? Apparently nothing but a sticky mess. Is minor 
jurisprudence a mistake? Genevieve Painter asks.
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Painter’s question is to the point. These essays do not simply explore 
minor jurisprudence, they assess it. Minor jurisprudence appears to 
us as an interesting and potentially productive way of engaging law 
that promised much when it first took the stage in the mid-1990s, but 
which has remained relatively undeveloped since that initial entrance.2 
These essays seize the opportunity to develop the concept. In doing so 
they also test it. What is the outcome? Tallow or tar? Tallow become 
tar? Both?
1. The Beginnings of Minor Jurisprudence3
At its inception, minor jurisprudence had two distinct incarnations. 
In 1994, Panu Minkkinen published an intriguing essay entitled ‘The 
Radiance of Justice: On the Minor Jurisprudence of Franz Kafka’, 
in which he deployed the concept of ‘minor literature’ developed by 
Gilles DeLeuze and Félix Guattari to interrogate Kafka’s conception 
of law (Minkkinen 1994). In Minkkinen’s view minor jurisprudence 
stood for a mode of jurisprudence that (like Kafka’s literature) resisted 
accommodation within any established canon or genre. Its resistance 
signified that it was something completely new, simply unlike the 
known ‘major’ canons of jurisprudential orthodoxy. Two years later, 
Peter Goodrich gave minor jurisprudence a different inflection, as 
any species of legal knowledge that had escaped ‘the phantom of a 
sovereign and unitary law’. The product of ‘rebels, critics, marginals, 
aliens, women and outsiders’, in this register ‘minor jurisprudence’ is 
simultaneously plural, subaltern and subversive (Goodrich 1996: 2). We 
might say that at this point of origin both Minkkinen and Goodrich 
conceived of the minor as other to the major’s tar: each formulation 
is a metaphor for difference and escape, and as such movement away. 
The reader might expect a molding of the idea to have ensued. But 
none took place. In 1999 Minkkinen responded, briefly, that in his 
view Goodrich’s formulation was ‘too much of a “critical oeuvre” of its 
author’, but otherwise did not take any further the matter of conceptual 




2. The Beginnings of ‘Law As …’
At this point it is appropriate to introduce a third actor, the symposium 
that goes by the title ‘Law As …’ Begun as a conference held in April 
2010 at the University of California, Irvine, and continued there (2012, 
2014) and at Berkeley (2016) as a biennial symposium, ‘Law As …’ has 
accumulated a bank of scholarship and commentary that represents a 
double move in legal scholarship: to deploy history as an interpretive 
practice – a theory, a methodology, a philosophy – with which to 
engage law; and simultaneously to offer history as a substantive 
site upon which other interpretive practices from across the broad 
spectrum of the humanities and social sciences can undertake their 
own engagement with law. 
A. Legal history as target of opportunity4
As the founding literature of the first conference makes clear, at its 
outset ‘Law As …’ was addressed specifically to the question of theory 
and method in legal history. Legal history is no more often given to 
explicit theorizing of itself than history at large, but to the extent it has 
a “default” theoretical orientation as a scholarly activity, legal history in 
its modern (post-1950) Anglophone form has adopted the rubric of 
‘law and’. Invented in the early twentieth century’s distinction between 
‘books’ and ‘action’, grounded in realism, and popularized by the law 
and society movement, ‘law and’ relies on empirical context to situate 
law as a domain of activity. It explains law through its relations to 
cognate but distinct domains of action – society, polity, economy – 
by parsing the interactions among them. The mainstream theory of 
legal history has exhibited the influence of  ‘law and’ in its resort to 
synchronic relational metaphors of conjunction/disjunction, to which it 
adds diachronic temporality as a further and essential relational index. 
Legal history’s mainstream method is comparative – it historicizes 
phenomena by situating them in temporally discrete empirical contexts 
(for example, periods), and attempts to reveal the effect of law, or to 
explain the reality of law, by assessing change over time in law relative 
to the contextualizing domain (society, polity, economy) from which it 
is held relationally distinct.
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Legal historical scholarship relies on the same broad relational 
hypotheses that at successive moments have preoccupied ‘law and’ 
theory: autonomy/instrumentalism, relative autonomy, mutual 
constitutiveness, legal constitutiveness, autopoiesis, and most recently 
contingency/complexity. To structure its narratives legal history draws 
on the same range of relational characterizations (functionalism, 
managed conflict, coercion-resistance, legitimation-disruption, agency-
disempowerment) and distributive effects (plurality, equilibrium, 
efficiency, utility) that have preoccupied ‘law and’ scholarship.
The 2010 conference accepted that participation in ‘law and’ 
theorizing had been highly productive in legal-historical scholarship. 
‘The question nevertheless arises whether we have arrived at an 
intellectual moment in which, a century after its invention, the 
relational perspective on law developed by “law and” theorizing has 
run its course. If so, what might be the implications for legal history?’ 
(Tomlins and Fisk 2009). In America, Holmes and Pound, and in the 
United Kingdom, Maitland, substituted society for history as law’s 
principal signifier as a matter (so to speak) of policy. ‘They fated legal 
history to become what it is – an account of relationality. If we now look 
past their “law and” what other possibilities might become available’ 
(Tomlins and Fisk 2009)?
Two scholarly tendencies sharpened the question: the first, long-
term, considers the social to be law’s most important determinative 
context, and the social to be empirically verifiable, such that law is held 
to be an empirical and social phenomenon. The second is the current 
scholarly tendency (which emerged dialectically from the first and is 
not confined to legal history or to law and society studies) to fetishize 
relational complexity and contingency to the point where relationality 
simply produces more of itself. The first tendency produced a causally 
functional and empirical account of law; the second tendency produced 
a devastating critique of that functional and empirical account to the 
point that, whatever realm of action in relation to which law is situated, 
the outcome can be shown to be indeterminacy marked by complexity 
and contingency. One should note that the critique has not dispensed 
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with the components of the received account. It did not produce a 
new account. It simply made any and every expression of the received 
account inexpressible in causal or functional terms.
B. Legal history as possibility
Suppose, asked ‘Law As …’, we let go of theory built from the 
conjunctive metaphors of the relational approach and its broken 
conception of causality, and instead reach for different metaphors. 
What would they be? They might be optical metaphors – of appearance 
or image, of focal length (blurring), of  ‘looking like’.  Instead of 
parsing relations between distinct domains of activity, between law 
and what lies ‘outside’ it, the objective of legal historical research 
might be to imagine them as the same domain: what do we get if we 
imagine law and economy as the same phenomenon – that is, law as 
economy (or economy as law)? Likewise, what of law as art, as science, 
as war, as peace? Or they might be material metaphors – of person in 
place, of the elements (earth, water, fire, air) from which lawscapes are 
created (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015; Bachelard 2002 [1943], 
2011 [1948]). Notably, we seem to have no difficulty in thinking of 
law imagistically in some domains but not in others: for example, law 
as expertise or even law as economy seems to pose less conceptual 
dissonance than law as forest (but see Anker 2017). 
‘Law As …’ imagined at least two possible routes such an exercise 
might open up. One was the creation of a distinct (and historical) account 
of relationality. The very tenacity of the conjunctive conceptualizations 
that underpin modernity’s ‘law and’ theorization raises the question, 
why did differentia of appearance (of economy, polity &c) come about? 
How did they become so powerful? By interrogating the production 
of differentiation we are led to questions of purpose and effect. As 
appearance came to distinguish cognate phenomena from law, what 
optics, aesthetics, functions or claims did law take up, and why? How 
did law represent or explain its own differentiation? With such an 
agenda the objective is not to ‘get rid’ of relationality or to challenge 
the familiar domains of polity, society and economy, but to discuss 
whether current relational theorizations are insufficient for the purposes 
of legal history and to explore what other theorizations might offer. 
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But one might also take the optical metaphor further – indeed 
beyond the metaphorical – to the point where one imagines law as a 
system of allegorical representation that completely displaces what is 
being represented. What would history become if relationality were 
foreclosed? How would  our perspectives on purportedly familiar 
domains change if the economic, the social, the political were imagined 
historically as appearing only from and in law? 
Here the differentiation between optical and material collapses. We 
find ourselves inhabiting lawscapes in which distinct materialities find 
their expression in distinct legalities, and in which encounters between 
these legalities emerges as the fundamental question (Barr 2017: 223; 
Dorsett and McVeigh 2012; Tomlins 2001, 2016). How then would 
law’s history appear?
3. The Meeting of Minor Jurisprudence with ‘Law As …’ 
‘Law As …’ purposely defined itself with modesty, ‘not by any means 
another proclamation of a new currency over outworn forms’, not a 
manifesto nor prescriptive statement of intent nor paradigm (Tomlins 
and Comaroff 2011:1040, 1079). Its intent has always been to serve as 
an opening that, as its signature ellipsis suggests, was simultaneously 
unfinished and beckoning. As a result, each of its events and resulting 
collections of articles5 had its own character. Still, the outcome has 
been a work in progress that has arced in the direction of situating 
‘Law As …’ in the realm of jurisprudence. That arc first became 
apparent in the 2012 symposium, in which the most marked tendency 
was exploration of the constellations that historical inquiry can create 
between past and present. This identified the ‘Law As …’ enterprise 
as one that could generate practical knowledge for the here-and-
now, ‘the moment, it might be said, when the origins of the present 
“jut manifestly and fearsomely into existence”, spirit into experience, 
metaphysics into materiality’ (Tomlins and Comaroff 2011: 1044. On 
jurisprudence as practical thinking, see Minkkinen 1999:3, 34, 97). A 
key outcome of the second conference was the possibility that ‘Law As 




The answer began to appear in the third ‘Law As …’ symposium 
(2014), which is where our actors first began to congeal. The kinds 
of jurisprudence suggested in the papers presented in 2014 were not 
‘sovereign or major jurisprudence’ (Goodrich 1996: 4), the jurisprudence 
that would have us understand law holistically, ‘as being all one thing 
or all another’ (Fisk and Gordon 2011: 525), that represents the 
legal order ‘as a system’, as ‘a relational structure formalized from 
normative phenomena and stratified within a framework of hierarchical 
rationality’ (Minkkinen 1994: 349, 350). Rather, the jurisprudences 
that ‘Law As …’ had begun to explore were jurisprudence in a minor 
key, a jurisprudence of plurality – of glossolalia.
Hence the fourth symposium (2016), the objective of which was to 
come to a clearer conception of what ‘minor jurisprudence’ entailed, 
how this somewhat dormant idea might be revived, what theoretical, 
conceptual, and/or methodological work it might do, and to what extent 
‘minor jurisprudence’ and ‘Law As …’ might coalesce.
To identify minor jurisprudence as an objective for the ongoing 
‘Law As …’ project is not to embrace a singular intellectual program, 
but rather the prospect of plurality. Glossolalia, after all, suggests the 
attractiveness (and mystery) of speaking of law and justice in different 
tongues. In some respects the difference between the varieties embraced 
by Peter Goodrich and Panu Minkkinen seems slight. Each after all 
is ‘other’ to the rule of law imagined by major jurisprudence, ‘as a 
conceptual construct the creation of which is regulated by the reason 
of modern science’ (Minkkinen 1994: 350). Each invokes Nietzsche, 
and Deleuze and Guattari, as inspiration (Minkkinen 1994: 357-62; 
Goodrich 1996: 175-78; Goodrich and Valverde 2005). Each recognizes 
that to attend to the history of legal science is necessarily (if not, in 
Minkkinen’s case, sufficiently) to attend to a history of power. Each 
is, to that extent, a critical jurisprudence that addresses law, whether 
‘as such’ or as ‘deep structure’. That said, their valences for the future 
of ‘Law As …’ are clearly distinct – the one (Goodrich) oppositional 
and antifoundational, the other (Minkkinen) initiatory and so, to that 
extent, foundational. To the extent that the legacy of post-structuralism 
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has been to trap the activity of critique in an endless loop that begets 
nothing other than more of itself, it is worth assessing whether, without 
sidestepping critique, ‘Law As …’ can offer means to benefit tangibly 
from critique while also moving through it, toward new foundational 
positions.6
4. Minor Jurisprudence in Historical Key
In the remainder of this introduction I describe, briefly and 
provisionally, the essays collected here. Together they represent the 
fullest and most complete interrogation of ‘minor jurisprudence’ since 
its inception. Individually they offer a cornucopia of provocations 
that advance jurisprudence in a minor and historical key. In a short 
conclusion I assess their implications for the future of ‘Law As …’ 
A. Characterizations
The first two essays in this collection offer us historical encounters 
with minor jurisprudence, and conceptual definitions. In ‘How 
Strange the Change from Major to Minor’, Peter Goodrich speaks 
of minor jurisprudences as ‘lifestyles, existential modes of inhabiting 
institutional space … that entail an open, plural and expansive thinking’ 
(30).7 In a striking image he declares the goal of a minor jurisprudence 
to be ‘to cut holes in the fabric of law … to tear the seamless web’ (30) 
in order ‘to insist upon more than law within the institution of legality’. 
For ‘[t]he minor is the crack in the edifice, the fissure in discourse, a 
site of incompatibility and novelty’ (32). But the minor does not come 
from without. It is ‘included in the major … of significance only in 
becoming part of the greater but is nothing of itself ’ (33). As such, if 
it ‘is not to be entirely oppositional, if it is to take its place as part of 
the legal institution it requires its own positivity. Critique is admirable 
as far as it goes, as method, as the child on the back of the norm, as 
rectitude of practice, but its tendency is to remain critique “of ” rather 
than substantive expression’ (42). Hence Goodrich enlarges on minor 
jurisprudence as a becoming, its trajectory toward the major, toward 
becoming the major, but a becoming that preserves its own original 
trace: ‘The major can be minor because the foetus invariably remains 
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present at the heart of being’ (45). Here is a dialectics of growth that 
invokes ‘the radicality of the child, the force of the inaugural in the 
free play of thought’ (42). In radicality and free play we encounter, of 
course, path-independency, the absence of any necessity. ‘The minor 
can be radically evil, dangerous, tortured, or open and full of aura and 
potential, fantasm and truth for you. Take your pick’ (44). We will 
return to this observation.
Mark Antaki’s ‘Making Sense of Minor Jurisprudence’ attempts 
to unravel both the concept and its relationship to the evolution of 
‘Law As …’. Stated generally, the appeal of minor jurisprudence, 
and its potential for ‘Law As …’ rests in its apparent ‘celebration of 
difference, of resistance, of refusal to conform, to grow up and become 
staid’ (54). This appearance of immanent critique is different from 
Goodrich’s ‘becoming’. For Antaki, however, this is not the promise 
of the concept.  Instead he points toward two specific separations that 
minor jurisprudence implies – the juridical-political separation ‘of law 
and justice from state and officialdom’ and the metaphysical separation 
of law from ‘the so-called metaphysics of presence’, from being, such 
that it might be (re)habilitated to becoming (59). 
Thus we encounter a convergence in comprehension of minor 
jurisprudence in our first two essays.  And here too we find a connection 
to ‘Law As …’ which describes itself ‘(as its ellipsis is designed to 
suggest)’ as an enterprise ‘in progress, underway, becoming’ (Tomlins 
2015: 247).  ‘Law As …’ has made a jurisprudential turn toward a 
form of jurisprudence that evinces a similar orientation to the world. 
Antaki supplies a welcome intellectual history of the impulse to 
minority in jurisprudence that recommends ‘Law As …’ temper its 
desires to move beyond post-structuralism by embracing the intiatory 
rather than seeking new foundations. Uniting his twin themes of un-
stating law and displacing being for becoming, Antaki finds minor 
jurisprudence (and implicitly ‘Law As …’) to be an essential component 
in ‘the attempt to think through the ‘art of not being governed’ (72, 




Following ‘Characterizations’, and the definitions and encounters 
there described, we move to a group of four essays that employ the idea 
of minor jurisprudence to clarify the specifities of distinct forms of 
legal-historical action. The first is Julieta Lemaitre’s ‘Manuel Quintín 
Lame: Legal Thought as Minor Jurisprudence’. As Lemaitre explains, 
Lame (1880-1967) was a leader of indigenous peoples in southern 
Colombia during the first half of the 20th century, and an autodidact 
who wrote profusely about law and justice, focusing on land rights and 
employing ‘a creative interpretation of statutory law … a strategic use 
of neo-scholastic jurisprudence and … his own reported visions and 
hallucinations’ (76). Asking ‘what kind of legal theory can be written 
by indigenous legal activists’, and whether the study of jurisprudence 
can’ take them seriously’, Lemaitre turns for elucidation to minor 
jurisprudence, understood as ‘the jurisprudence of a minority, of 
the situated, historical subordinate position that uses the dominant 
language of law, its ideas and canon, as it were, not to represent or 
speak-for a group, but instead to destabilize the complacency of the 
majority, and suggest alternatives’. She finds minor jurisprudences 
‘located in a place in history – the Jewish ghetto of pre-war Prague, 
the terrajero indentured servitude of the Cauca Andes’ – places and 
experiences from which minor jurisprudences arise to create ‘marginal 
and subversive account[s] of the formalisms, fictions and justifications 
of established law’ (77). In Lame’s case it appears in the form of profuse 
but scattered writings, ‘letters and newspaper articles … interrupted 
by lapses into poetry and mystic visions … extended paraphrases of 
well-known legal authorities’ in which Lame ‘chang[ed] words to suit 
his needs’. Lame’s writing had ‘a disturbing and alluring effect, de-
territorializing legal expertise by both claiming the authority to speak 
as a lawyer, and performing that authority in tandem with appeals 
to poetry and emotion, and with odd forms of legal bricolage and 
innovative interpretations’. Lame paid the price of ‘speaking in law’: his 
ideas accepted the colonial violence that denied cultural differentiation 
to indigenous peoples, lumping them together as ‘los indios’, inferior 
and weak, whose rights would be defined by the colonizer (81). But 
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he challenged the liberal jurisprudence of a social contract amongst 
putative equals, describing law instead as ‘a fragile armistice between 
an invading army and a vanquished people … between the strong and 
the weak’, between the white and mestizo public and the conquered 
indigenous population ‘whose grief and dissolution and land loss seem 
to be inevitable as much as invisible, inaudible, meaningless’ (78). 
Crucially, this did not mean that the law was immune to a concept 
of justice the measure of which was indigenous suffering. Lame 
‘builds on a colonial tradition of indigenous legalism, re-links it to 
collective resistance, and lays the way for the contemporary indigenous 
movement’s rebellious legalism. That innovative use of legal arguments 
merits his consideration as an author of minor jurisprudence […] a 
tragic jurisprudence, rooted in loss and sorrow, destitute and yet still 
appealing to law and justice’ (87, 91).
Natalie Davidson’s ‘Toward a Self-Ref lexive Law? Narrating 
Torture’s Legality in Human Rights Litigation’ engages minor 
jurisprudence in a distinct fashion, less as a matter of legal thought’s 
substance than as an artefact of how law is presented in action. Davidson 
asks: to what extent can law know itself and so combat itself? Can law 
recognize itself ‘as a tool of physical atrocity’ or will it always deny 
that atrocity could be legal? The question is fundamental to Nazi 
law and its judgment at Nuremberg, but Davidson finds the question 
just as pressing in the reliance on courts of current ‘authoritarian 
regimes’, and the growing, paradoxical obsession with legal form 
accompanying widespread violence in the neo-liberal era’ in which 
‘rule by law’ challenges ‘rule of law’ (101, citing Rajah 2012, 50; and 
see Rajah 2017). Davidson’s measuring stick is a case study – ‘a class 
action filed in a Hawaii federal court on behalf of 10,000 Philippine 
victims of torture and other gross abuses against Ferdinand Marcos, 
one month after his ouster from power in 1986, a suit ‘in which 
the key part played by law in atrocity was made explicit’ because of 
Marcos’s careful creation of modes of legal legitimacy for his regime 
– ‘constitutional amendments and Supreme Court approvals of his 
concentrations of power’ (102, 105). Davidson treats the suit as a site 
for minor jurisprudence in the sense advanced by Peter Goodrich in 
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1996: her goal is to recover practices ‘denied or ignored’, ‘repressed or 
absorbed’ (Goodrich 1996: 3) so as ‘to disrupt assumptions prevalent in 
mainstream legal scholarship’ (104). But she finds those disruptions not 
outside but within the processes of orthodox law itself, in this case in 
trial proceedings. ‘While trial proceedings are of course conventional 
sources of sociolegal history, neither they nor the historical narratives 
contained in them are conventional sources of normative legal analysis’ 
(104) which overwhelmingly turns on the ‘mandarin’ texts (Gordon 
1984: 120) of appellate doctrine and commentary. Even as they have 
‘historicized the law in order to recover alternative paths’ critical 
scholars, too, have neglected the dross of proceedings to emphasize 
doctrinal texts. Like Goodrich’s work in this collection, Davidson’s 
analysis of the trial proceedings in Marcos points to ‘the minor within 
the major’ (104). Like Manuel Quintín Lame she brushes law against 
the grain. In Marcos ‘trial proceedings offered opportunities for rich, 
detailed discussions of constitutional structure, legal formalism and 
victims’ experiences of law’ – here is the minor key, the legality of 
violence and death, which is then ‘erased and obscured’ by ‘the more 
abstract discussions of higher courts … that are diffused throughout 
the legal community.  In Marcos, ‘the insights gleaned during the lower 
court proceedings’ expose ‘the close imbrication of brutal violence 
[and] law’. They also expose ‘the difficulties of undoing such violence’ 
within a legal framework that soothes itself with doctrinal lullabies 
that such law is not law at all. Davidson’s prescription is ‘detailed 
historical analysis’ to reveal ‘the web of contingent doctrinal limitations, 
litigation strategies, political constraints and cultural assumptions that 
shaped the historical narratives in this case’ beginning in its actual trial 
proceedings and ‘suggesting paths for reconstruction’. This analysis is, 
for Davidson, minor jurisprudence in action: ‘a mode of legal theorizing 
beyond critique’ (119, 120). 
Laurent de Sutter’s ‘On the Magic of Law’ also uncovers the 
minor within the major, and in a fashion not unlike Davidson’s 
analysis, although at a remove. Davidson tells us that the minor can 
be uncovered within the major though an exercise of patient historical 
digging.  De Sutter reports on just such an exercise, undertaken at the 
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turn of the twentieth century by the French jurist and legal historian 
Paul Huvelin (1873-1924), a moment when Huvelin’s form of legal 
inquiry was being overwhelmed by ‘the social’ or ‘socially-oriented 
legal thought’ (Kennedy 2006: 21) such that Huvelin was rendered an 
obscure, forgotten figure. Yet Huvelin’s question was crucial: ‘What 
makes law into something different than a mere set of words whose only 
power would lie in the force of those strong enough to make sure that 
one could not escape the consequences of one’s actions – what makes 
law something else than brute strength’ (125)? Huvelin’s search was 
for ‘an explanation for the obligatory effect of obligations’. His answer, 
understated, ‘was both curious and timely: what if, he more or less 
wrote, there was yet something to investigate apropos the relationship 
between law and magic’ (126)? Huvelin’s answer was unacceptable to 
the group of French sociologists led by Émile Durkheim with whom 
he was in conversation, for whom ‘the efficiency of magic’ was ‘the mere 
set of social conventions through which a community would illusion 
itself, so fulfilling some collective needs that could not be fulfilled 
otherwise ... shared beliefs, responding to some social requirements’ 
that ‘as such, it belonged to the realm of representations, and not to the 
realm of reality or of practices’ (127). But Huvelin persisted: ‘being a 
lawyer, he knew that if anything happens in the world, it is because of 
details being carefully envisaged … Society never entails any effect; 
what entails an effect always is one singular detail, one specific gesture 
or given set of words, inserted into a broader context that only provides 
the ecology for this detail to lead to the results being expected from it 
to produce’. The result was Huvelin’s Magie et droit individual, a minor 
jurisprudence of ritual that recovered the ‘magic’ of obligation from the 
detail of a multitude of cases obscured by social generalization. The 
book ‘resembled an anthology of disparate cases and examples from 
which no overarching story seemed to unfold, and about which no 
explanation seemed completely satisfactory. In the course of his listing 
of cases, Huvelin would only offer glimpses at a possible general view, 
through short sentences resounding like hard-to-decipher oracles, 
left suspended in the air, waiting for someone to interpret them in 
one way or another’ (131). De Sutter calls Huvelin’s interests ‘timely’ 
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for, as he observes, ‘the end of the nineteenth century, and beginning 
of the twentieth, was a moment when magic was everywhere’ (138). 
But it was also the moment of Weberian disenchantment, and ‘the 
social’ – the moment when both the substance, and the method, and 
the abiding assumptions of Huvelin’s mode of legal inquiry was being 
subjected to sustained, withering critique. ‘What Huvelin wanted was 
a theory of the legal act that was not dependent upon the person who 
would utter the word (or make the gestures), but on the words (or the 
gestures) themselves – and not because of their meaning, but because of 
their, say, “genre”. There must be a certain type of words or actions that 
can be called “magic”, and whose use within a legal context produces 
necessary consequences, whatever the social context is … There must 
be an inner necessity of law, or else it is only void – that is, pure force, 
pure application of the relationship of power within a certain group 
of human beings, pure legitimization of something that would have 
happened anyway ... this is precisely what Huvelin was looking for and 
that he found, thanks to the concept of magic. What he found was the 
inner necessity of the form, understood not in the sense of respect due to 
some formalities, but in the most specific sense of forming – the giving 
of shape to what had none before’ (141).8 Unfortunately for Huvelin, he 
was an untimely guest at the triumphant birth of socially-oriented legal 
thought. Its ferocious critique both of his question and of his methods 
rendered him and his answer obscure. His major was made minor.
Finally, Panu Minkkinen returns to the concept of minor 
jurisprudence that he helped to bring into being more than twenty 
years ago in his essay ‘“Life Grasps Life”: Wilhelm Dilthey’s Minor 
Jurisprudence’. A polymath – historian, psychologist, sociologist, 
and hermeneutic philosopher, elected in 1859 to Hegel’s Chair in 
Philosophy at the University of Berlin – Dilthey (1833-1911) was 
older than Huvelin but like him became intellectually located amid 
the ‘rise’ of ‘the social’ and its disciplines at the turn of the twentieth 
century. He sought to create a grand substantive foundation for the 
new human sciences (the social sciences and humanities) ‘as disciplines 
clearly distinct from the natural sciences’ (144) by mobilizing the 
concept Geisteswissenschaft – the ‘science of the spirit’. Collectively the 
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Geisteswissenschaften would map and analyze the entire human social 
formation on the basis of their unique capacity to grasp the human 
‘inner experience’ scientifically, ‘to develop verifiable “first-order 
truths” about the “psychophysical life-unit” in the different social and 
historical contexts in which she acts’  (146-7). Dilthey, then, was on 
the opposite side of the substantive and methodical transition to ‘the 
social’ that claimed Huvelin. He had ‘an explicit scientific agenda’ (144). 
The law that his agenda would pour forth would be animated by the 
‘first-order truths’ that science would discover. Yet, Minkkinen tell us, 
the moment claimed Dilthey too. ‘[H]is original aim of providing a 
scientifically feasible foundation for all the human sciences gradually 
los[t] its plausibility’ (144). As it did so, a second influence emerged 
to enliven Dilthey’s purpose, that of vitalism: ‘the vitalistic nature of 
his life-philosophy becomes ever more prominent. Life, then, not only 
animates the incompatible taxonomies of the human sciences, but it 
is also responsible for the “repulsive” force that ultimately prevents 
the human scientist from fixing her concepts and doctrines into the 
systemic frameworks that “major jurisprudence” insists on’ (144). Unable 
to create an integrated and holistic scientific foundation for all the 
human sciences in the face of their incompatible taxonomies, Dilthey’s 
schema became a duality of second-order systems: ‘cultural systems’ 
on the one hand – ‘collaborative networks into which individuals enter 
with the aim of achieving designated purposes that can be reached 
through cooperation either more efficiently or exclusively’; and on the 
other the ‘external organization of society’, by which Dilthey meant 
‘existing structures that make up the institutional framework of the 
world’ into which individuals are born and which they inhabit – the 
family, the state and so forth (149-50). Between these two unintegrated 
components, Dilthey nominated law as the shuttle, the means of 
communication between. Dilthey’s background in legal analysis was 
not dissimilar to Huvelin’s – ‘hermeneutics and interpretation’ – but 
unlike de Sutter, for Minkkinen these are ‘little more than historical 
curiosities’ (149) that (unlike Huvelin) Dilthey left behind him for law 
as social mediator.  Minkkinen labels this a form of ‘law and society’ 
jurisprudence, a jurisprudence in which law is neither positivist nor 
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natural, ‘belongs’ to neither second-order system, but instead exists 
always in-between, constituted wholly by ‘constant cross-referencing’ 
(151), animated by ‘the sense of justice of individuals’ (154). Why call 
this jurisprudence ‘minor’? ‘Like its “major” counterpart,’ Minkkinen 
tells us, ‘Dilthey’s jurisprudence begins with an attempt to provide a 
scientific foundation for understanding law as an element of human 
life. The attempt ends in failure, not because of a deficiency specific to 
law, but because all such foundationalist aspirations are destined to fail 
from the beginning … Like a mistake that we can foresee but must, 
nonetheless, make, a minor jurisprudence would, rather, involve the 
acknowledgement of a “tragic failure” by embracing the full potential 
of the vitalism that Dilthey ends up with. In those vitalistic terms, 
the “minor jurisprude” is no different to the psychophysical life-unit 
that she studies. She is driven by the same conative impulses, and she 
encounters the same resistances as the being whose world she attempts 
to grasp. Indeed, her grasping can itself only be a conative impulse 
among others, a desire to understand, and her understanding can only 
take place at the pressure points where that impulse meets its resistant 
counterparts ... the ‘minor jurisprude’ is not fully determined by the 
failure of her foundationalist task because the task itself is animated 
by life. And so the jurisprude is doomed – or more appropriately, 
perhaps, delivered – to her tragic fate’ (160). The impossibility of 
realizing Dilthey’s original foundationalist project necessarily renders 
his jurisprudence minor. Implicitly Minkkinen suggests that all claims 
for ‘major’ jurisprudences are built on the mistake, or tragic failure, or 
lie, of a false foundationalism, that the minor is all there can ever be.
C. Materializations
From ‘Applications’ we move on to three essays that I have grouped under 
the title ‘Materializations’. Each interrogates minor jurisprudence from 
a materially grounded standpoint. In Shaun McVeigh’s case, the ground 
is a specific locale – London – transected by lines of communication 
(notably bus routes, which are modern traces of much older lines of 
communication) that offer a representation of the city ‘mostly through 
its absence, as a city of justice, reason, civility, commerce and asylum’, 
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and that, by offering acess to that imaginaire of the city, are means to 
train subjects as jurisprudents, means to cultivate ‘the persona of the 
jurisprudent and the conduct of the office of jurisprudent’ through an 
education in the order (whether real or desired) of the city as place 
(165). McVeigh’s essay in this collection is one of several such projects 
(see, for example, McVeigh 2016). Together they can be considered 
exercises in minor jurisprudence because they are conceived in sympathy 
with the traditions cultivated by  minor jurisprudence. ‘For some the 
central concern of a “minor jurisprudence” has been the conduct of 
lawful relations apart from the major political and philosophical 
jurisprudences of State and Reason. Others have been more concerned 
with differentiating jurisprudences from the variety of modes and styles 
of lawful existence expressed in the major legal western legal traditions 
… Finally, there has been a distinct concern with judgment and the 
genres of jurisprudence writing. The style of minor jurisprudences 
has been pitched against those that are general and systematic and in 
favour of those that are particular … Here attention is turned towards 
how a jurisprudent might take up responsibility for a pattern of lawful 
relations of a place (such as London)’ (166-7). In McVeigh’s case 
both the idea of pattern or patterning – ‘patterning might be thought 
of as a way of finding, or finding yourself in, relations of law’ – and 
the conceit of lines of communication are derived from Australian 
indigenous jurisprudence (see Black 2011, Chatwin 1987). ‘What 
is followed here is the training in the patterning of lawful relations 
suggested in a number of minor jurisprudences across a part of South 
London ... In the varied European jurisprudences, “being placed” 
and being patterned into relations has become a complex matter of 
engagement and dispute. The jurisprudence of a place or the way “we” 
are placed, for example, as “of London”, rarely settles into one form of 
relationship whether it be authorised through the conduct of lawful 
relations or other forms of association. The minor jurisprudences are 
addressed here through the way they introduce, and respond to, a 
patterning of material, institutional and ideational existence into place’ 
(167). These are not jurisprudences of rejection. ‘If the exercises and 
training in office offered in forms of minor jurisprudence were to be 
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encapsulated in one gesture it would not be a training in disgust or 
indignation (although it might involve a training in ability to be joyful 
and dignified). All, for example, are concerned with maintaining the 
office of the scholar and with countering the deadening effects of state 
law and major jurisprudences. They seek to cultivate something like 
a cosmopolitan ethic and to enliven law by educating students into 
“breakthrough”  experiences that move beyond, interrupt or rupture 
the everyday experience of law’ (172). McVeigh pursues his theme with 
reference to three accounts of minor jurisprudence – those of Panu 
Minkkinen and Peter Goodrich, about which much has already been 
said here, and that of Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, whose 
concept of ‘lawscape’ (2015) offers a new materialist vein of spatial 
justice.
The second essay in this group is also the most ‘grounded’ in the 
collection. Kirsten Anker’s ‘Law As…Forest: Eco-logic, Stories and 
Spirits in Indigenous Jurisprudence’ is written from the perspective of 
Mount Royal, in and above Montreal. ‘The Mountain is a lawscape, 
and the neologism speaks not just to the knowledge that law must 
have a material existence in some place, but also to the way that law 
authorises and enacts the mark of humans on the land’ (191-2). But this 
is only one way of understanding the interaction of law and ground. 
‘I am reminded of Indigenous friends and colleagues who claim that 
the law is “in” or “of ” the ground … that “the land is the source of the 
law”’(193). Which enacts which? As Anker introduces and encapsulates 
the problematic we find ourselves pulled backward to that turn-of-
the-twentieth-century upheaval that ensnared Huvelin and Dilthey. 
‘That human minds are the only source of law designed to act on the 
world (and for that matter, that humans are the only legal subjects) 
speaks to a set of distinctions provoked and amplified by modernity’s 
rationalisation of mysticism, a condition that Max Weber called 
disenchantment … in which the world came to be seen as “knowable, 
predictable, and manipulable by humans”  … Disenchantment divides 
mind from matter, human from non-human, culture from nature’ (193). 
Anker’s essay is about the multiple standpoints – the plurality of minor 
jurisprudences – from which this division might be overcome, from 
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the Earth Jurisprudence that even in its critique of the Anthropocene 
maintains the Western logocentricity that persists in privileging 
minds, to ‘Indigenous forms of deep participation in ecological process 
[that] suggest that the mythos of storied places is more apt to account 
for grounded jurisprudence than logos’ (194). Along the way Anker 
ensnares critical scholars whose metaphors – precedent as a ‘forest of 
constraint’, for example – speak of their inability to escape a ‘linguistic 
memory [in which] trees constituted an obstacle to cultivation’ for an 
experience of forests ‘as a co-evolved network of relationships’ (196). 
The remedy for disenchantment, Anker concludes, requires more than 
an imagination enlivened to new patterns. It requires ‘attention to the 
way the world is enchanted, the ways in which its mind manifests. 
Most obviously, this requires direct experience with forests and so 
on. But disrupting our cognitive schemas also requires attempting to 
privilege, within our own thought patterns, those modes that reflect 
the way that forests think’ (208). 
The final essay in this group is Olivia Barr’s ‘Legal Footprints’, the 
most self-consciously methodological approach to minor jurisprudence 
in this collection. Barr has already made her own substantial and 
original contribution to the literature on minor jurisprudence (2013, 
2016), thus joining Minkkinen and Goodrich in particular as a principal 
innovator of the idea. Here she pursues her analysis of the meaning of 
legality through how we walk and where we walk – ‘the movements of 
laws, the laws of movement, and the place of our feet, legally, in this 
maze of non-linear movements’ – in an ‘autoethnographic’ essay that 
unites poetry, prose and picture as three genres of representation of 
locality, globality, and place, of their ‘intense materiality’ (233), and of 
‘how we notice, experience and understand the active nature of laws’ 
moving places in the world, and how this relates to walking’ (214). 
For Barr, minor jurisprudence is as much method as interpretation 
or imagination. Like Davidson, her minor jurisprudence ‘requires 
drawing out certain strands of legal practice, often working in less 
visible archives’ (221). For Davidson, the ‘less visible archive’ of 
legality is that of trial proceedings.  For Barr it is ‘feet on the ground, 
a local mural, cycling through a park or a bus ride’ (221). As method, 
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minor jurisprudence ‘provide[s] space for otherwise jurisprudentially 
overlooked topics, techniques, concepts, practices and sites to slowly, 
incompletely, yet gently emerge’. Her approach, like all the essays in this 
group, is intensely materialist. As such it offers ‘radical new possibilities 
for jurisprudential thought … deepening our understandings of where 
laws are, how they work, and how we might better live “with” not only 
our own forms of law, but the laws of others’ (221). The discovery of 
such a method is of crucial importance to the jurisprudent. ‘[T]he office 
of the critic inherits a tradition of critique and is able to step outside 
law, yet for the office of the jurist or jurisprudent, such an escape is not 
possible. For the jurisprudent, the challenge becomes one of remaining 
critical without abandoning law or official responsibilities to the act of 
exercising sound judgment in practical matters of law’ (221). McVeigh 
has offered one method that allows the jurisprudent to remain within 
law, and with law, while also remaining critical. Barr, more explicitly, 
offers another.
D. Hesitations
From ‘Materializations’ we pass, finally, to “Hesitations’, so entitled 
because of all the essays in this collection, those that appear in 
this final section are the most reserved in their assessments of the 
utility of minor jurisprudence. The first is Jothie Rajah’s ‘A Minor 
Jurisprudence of Spectacular War: Law as Eye in the Sky’. Rajah’s essay 
is a critical analysis of Gavin Hood’s movie Eye in the Sky, released 
in 2016. As Rajah explains, the movie is a fictional depiction of the 
legalities of drone warfare, in the setting of an Anglo-American drone 
assassination of Al-Shabaab militants in Kenya, who include U.K. and 
U.S. Nationals, and who are in the final stages of preparation for a 
terror attack assessed as likely to result in multiple civilian casualties. 
‘With lives at stake’, notably the life of a child innocently occupying 
a position within the drone missile’s strike zone, ‘we watch elite, 
mid- and low-ranking American and British state actors – military 
personnel, cabinet ministers, the British Attorney General, the Senior 
Legal Advisor to the U.S. National Security Council – as the decision 
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is made to conduct the targeted killing. In the process, against the 
urgency of a ticking bomb scenario, these various lawyers, politicians, 
and military personnel express competing values and understandings 
of law and reality’. Rajah argues that ‘the contestation around law and 
values animating Eye might be seen as an expression of jurisprudence’, 
and further that a minor jurisprudence is expressed in those 
elements of the contestation that evince a particular suspicion of ‘the 
complacency and status or establishment of law’ (Goodrich 1996: vii). 
So far, so good. But a problem arises from the depiction of the contest 
between major and minor jurisprudence in Eye. ‘As jurisprudence, 
Eye represents contemporary drone warfare as a highly regulated 
legal system structured around an ethical valuing of civilian life’ (253-
4). It is also a highly undemocratic system – a system predicated 
upon ‘spectacular war’ that dazzles citizen-subjects with glamorized 
technological gadgetry which reduces them to a state of complacent 
non-participatory deactivation (254). In Eye, the only trace of the 
non-technocratic questioning citizen-subject who speaks ethically for 
civilian life in defiance of roomfuls of politicians, legal advisors, and 
military superiors appears in the unlikely shape of the lowest-ranked 
military personnel – those responsible for actually prosecuting the 
mission – whose questions (on our behalf ) are answered, indirectly 
but conclusively, by a final icy retort to a hectoring politician from 
the highest-ranked general-in-charge: ‘never tell a soldier that he does 
not know the cost of war’ (Rickman 2016). In its acute questioning of 
drone warfare, a system serviced, not scrutinized, by law, Eye appears 
to fit the role of a minor jurisprudence. But it does so, Rajah argues, 
only to pursue other distractions: first, from the ‘de-democratizing 
and dehumanizing concealments and erasures that accompany drone 
warfare’ – after all, the low-ranking soldiers (young, attractive and 
thoughtful, one male, one female) do speak up and are heard, and 
after they are reluctantly satisfied and their job is done they suffer for 
all of us, morally and physically, on Eye’s cross (see Tomlins 2016: 2); 
and second, from the ‘re-making of lawful authority, and of nation-
state sovereignty, through a dramatization of the (highly contested) 
international law principle, responsibility to protect’ which becomes the 
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moral of the putatively tragic story, the justification of a child’s death 
for the greater good of preventing a deadly terror attack. By engaging 
in its own careful erasures and concealments – ‘by rendering visible a 
particular set of actors, narratives, and questions, while concealing and 
erasing others‘ – Eye ends up offering a powerful legitimation of drone 
warfare on its own terms. It chooses its own set of ‘actors, institutions, 
practices, and technologies’ and valorizes them (254). ‘In this alternative 
legal system, it is military and counterterrorism personnel (not lawyers, 
and certainly not politicians!) who can be trusted to be protective of 
innocence, and ethical in their decision making. In short, Eye convinces 
us that the experts able to meet the demands of planetary jurisdiction 
are military, technological, and counter-terrorism experts operating 
beyond the sphere of nation-state sovereignty’ (258).  Eye in the Sky 
offers its audience a minor jurisprudence of spectacular war more 
disturbing than the major jurisprudence that the minor criticizes.
Genevieve Painter’s ‘Law as Minor Jurisprudence: Is it a Mistake?’ 
is no less critical. Starting from an ‘innocent’ question, ‘what is law as 
minor jurisprudence’ (276), Painter argues that claims made on behalf 
of the transformational capacities of minor jurisprudence – whether 
revelatory/unmasking or initiatory/foundational – are overblown. For 
one thing, taken on their own terms, the claims assume some thing 
to be unmasked or replaced – minor jurisprudence, it seems, cannot 
exist in its own right, but only in relation to that whose transformation 
or replacement is desired. Second, the claims themselves impute 
intention to transformation. But, as illustrated in historical examples 
of indigenous-settler encounter, mistake – error – can be just as 
transformational as intention. In that regard, minor jurisprudence 
offers no intrinsic capacity to guide action. Finally (and here Painter 
is at one with Rajah), if ‘minor jurisprudence’ is simply an ambition to 
transform, any form of transformation becomes admissible, including 
those that are morally and politically reprehensible. Painter offers ‘the 
early days of the Trump Administration’ and its assault on ‘human 
and non-human flourishing’ (277) as an example of an assault on an 
existing state of affairs with intent to transform, qualifying as a harmful 
expression of minor jurisprudence. Summarizing, then: ‘(1) minor 
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jurisprudence requires major jurisprudence to be cognizable; (2) little 
intrinsic to the concept of minor jurisprudence offers normative political 
guidance’ leading us to ‘(3) the idea of law as minor jurisprudence may 
be a mistake’ (277).
How might one respond to Painter’s critique? First, it seems 
clear that among the ‘Applications’ and ‘Materializations’ of minor 
jurisprudence that we have encountered, there are certainly those that, 
implicitly or explicitly, embrace a ‘major’ as their stage or backdrop. 
The essays by Anker, Lemaitre, and particularly Davidson serve as 
examples, as do those (less overtly) by de Sutter and Minkkinen. 
But in all these essays minor jurisprudences also exist normatively 
cognizable for themselves (see e.g. Eiss 2011: 713-14 and compare 
Lemaitre 2017: 83-7), not simply as phenomena called into existence 
and defined by that to which they are other, merely elements in a dialog. 
Minor jurisprudences are equally cognizable on their own terms in the 
more methodological attempts by McVeigh and Barr to locate bases 
and spaces for ‘living well’ with the law that we have. Goodrich and 
Antaki, we have seen, both render minor jurisprudence conceptually 
as a becoming, on a trajectory, but a becoming that yet preserves itself. 
These examples do not refute Painter’s point, but they do soften its 
impact, particularly in their plurality. 
As to the sufficiency of the transformational ambition, Goodrich, 
too argued that. ‘[t]he minor can be radically evil, dangerous, tortured, 
or open and full of aura and potential, fantasm and truth for you. Take 
your pick’. There is nothing to the standpoints that embody the minor 
that provides any per se justification for their content. Fascism was/
is a minor jurisprudence. So are ‘the streets’ (295) where, of course, 
fascists fight many of their battles. Rather than seek normative 
political guidance from the minor, it is to the minor – in particular to 
its trajectories – that normative political judgment must be applied. 
Here there is no disagreement
We are left with ‘mistake’. Does mistake render minor (and major) 
standpoints meaningless? Perhaps – if one accepts speech act theory 
as determinative, susceptible to no ‘Archimedean “outside context” 
24
Christopher Tomlins
point from which a speech situation can be analysed’ (281). Painter 
puts it thus: ‘Speech acts that are legal claims illustrate how vantage 
point shapes expectations about how words work. The law contains 
vantage-point specific conventions for speech that determine whether 
utterances succeed’ (281). One cannot escape by alleging error or 
miscreance. ‘Perceiving a mistake requires comparing speech against 
the expectations embedded in the speech situation. The words 
themselves don’t offer a neutral vantage point for determining their 
felicity. The context of those words does not solve the problem either. 
Moving the problem of perspective from “accepted convention” to 
“appropriate context” is no help because there is no view from outside 
context and no “within context” criteria for choosing context’ (281). 
One can acknowledge the argument, and add that if we are nevertheless 
still to write history Painter’s argument teaches us that we must use 
our own criteria. This is one of the principles that ‘Law As …’ has 
generated for itself. ‘There is no way for us to say what they were doing 
unless we commit ourselves to the criteria on which the meaning of 
our words depends. This is a political commitment. Reducing history 
entirely to understanding the people of the past means making no 
commitment to any political community. That makes the truth about 
the past impossible to tell’. (Fasolt 2015: 458; Tomlins 2016: 16-17).
5. Conclusion
In its brief life, ‘Law As …’ has never attempted to be much more 
than a place for  inspections of law that offer novelty, dissonance, and 
creativity to the practice of legal history. As an activity ‘Law As …’ 
has arced toward jurisprudence, a site where ideas from law and from 
history, and from the philosophies of both, can intersect productively 
(see e.g. Del Marr and Lobban 2016; Desautels-Stein and Tomlins 
2017). But to what kind of jurisprudence might ‘Law As …’ aspire? The 
fourth symposium has examined minor jurisprudence as an option and 
has found it to be a creative standpoint on law, although – as the essays 
by Rajah and Painter in particular attest – not one to be embraced 
injudiciously. As they remind us, the minor as well as the major is tar 
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as well as tallow. 
‘Damnation’s Cellar’ canvassed the end of history in the invention 
of a time machine (Costello et al. 1993). We cannot escape history. But 
if we are to escape damnation’s cellar we have little choice but to use 
all of what is to hand, not leave it behind. Indeed, it is our obligation. 
The Benjamin whom Painter cites desired that ‘nothing that has ever 
happened should be regarded as lost for history’, and so exhorted 
history’s chroniclers to narrate events ‘without distinguishing between 
major and minor ones’ (Benjamin 2006: 390, emphasis added). The 
recovery of the minor, the struggle to redeem all of the past – ‘the 
“refuse” and “detritus” of history, the half-concealed, variegated traces 
of the daily life of the collective’ (Eiland and McLaughlin 2002: ix) 
was the obligation of the historical materialist, even in the face of 
its acknowledged impossibility in that ‘only a redeemed mankind is 
granted the fullness of its past’ (Benjamin 2006: 390); which is to say 
(Costello et al. notwithstanding) that only God can grant mankind a 
past ‘become citable in all its moments’ (390). For ourselves, we must 
recover the minor to create the possibility of seizing the past ‘as an 
image that flashes up at the moment of its recognizability’. For only 
then can the historical materialist ‘brush history against the grain’ 
(Benjamin 2006: 390, 392). If, then, ‘Law As …’ can indeed be a minor 
jurisprudence in a historical key, and if, further, that jurisprudence can 
be given a task, it is this. ‘The historian is the herald who invites the 
dead to the table’ (Benjamin 2002: 481).  
Endotes
∗ Elizabeth Josselyn Boalt Professor of Law (Jurisprudence & Social Policy) 
at the University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall) School of Law.
1. For reasons of copyright I am foreclosed from demonstrating the aptness of 
Costellos’ lyrics.  Those who would see for themselves are urged to do so.
2. Beyond this collection, and works cited in this introduction, other examples 
of work invoking or examining ‘minor jurisprudence’ include Barr 2013, 
2016; Green 2008; Loizidou 1999; and Van Marle 2012.
3. This section and the next rely on Tomlins 2015.
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4. This section and the next rely on Tomlins and Fisk 2009.
5. See “Law As...” Theory and Method in Legal History UC Irvine Law 
Review (2011) 1: 519-1079; “Law As . . .” II, History As Interface for the 
Interdisciplinary Study of Law UC Irvine Law Review (2014) 4: 1-491; 
“Law As . . .” III, Glossolalia: Toward A Minor (Historical) Jurisprudence 
UC Irvine Law Review (2015) 5: 239-511.
6. In contrast to the suggestions of immanent critique Barr (2013: 73) situates 
her embrace of minor jurisprudence as one ‘that accepts the institution 
of common law’ and attends to ‘the place of jurisdictional testimony in 
historical vignettes’, by which means ‘it becomes possible to attend to the 
substrate of how common law comes to be in place through technologies 
of jurisdiction’.  Dorsett and McVeigh describe their approach as one that 
‘does not look for ways and means of transcending or escaping law but 
seeks to deepen and expand the ways of engaging with law’ (2012: 20, 
and generally 20-29).
7. All unattributed parenthetical page citations in this introduction refer to 
pages in this volume of Law Text Culture.
8. For further discussion of the speech act, see Painter 2017.
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